

Towards a Global Agenda on Migration and Development? Evidence from Senegal

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ABSTRACT

The migration-development nexus has been of increasing importance in international relations between African and European countries since 2000. Linking migration to development has spurred political interest in the development potential of migrants as a substitute for official development assistance. This paper analyses the convergence in discourse and practices on migration and development in the context of migration policies formulated to manage migration between Africa and Europe. The discourse on migration and development is mobilised by different actors to justify their actions; it stems from different migration management concepts and frameworks advocated by the European Union, particularly in its Global Approach to Migration. The migration and development discourse is sustained by increased funding from the European Union and some member states to instil a particular view of the nexus between migration and development. The case of Senegal in this paper illustrates the application of the dominant discourse. The first section provides an analysis of the discourse mobilised by different actors at the European and African levels to justify the promotion of the migration-development nexus. The second section scrutinises the practices and roles of the actors involved in the design and implementation of recent programmes in Senegal. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Accepted 30 November 2012

Keywords: migration; development; ECOWAS; European Union; Africa; Senegal

INTRODUCTION

The link between international migration and development has been of increasing importance in multilateral migration management initiatives since 2000. Proposed measures stress the scale of migration flows and the positive impact of migration on source countries when it is 'managed' in an 'orderly' fashion (IOM and FOM, 2005). This has prompted a profusion of new initiatives and actors. The discourse mobilised is highly utilitarian (Piché, 2009): it stresses the need to 'develop' the countries of origin to stem irregular migration by enabling people to remain in their homeland, as affirmed by the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 (UNFPA, 1994). Creating favourable conditions purportedly requires the participation of sending countries in the global economy and, by extension, the liberalisation of trade and the creation of an attractive investment environment. The management approach thus legitimises the subordination of migration to the requirements of the global economy. The related measures include promotion of foreign direct investment, relocation of businesses, the creation of free trade areas, and the involvement of migrants in the development of their countries of origin (Guengant, 1996).

Numerous recent studies have pointed out the reemergence of the debate on migration and development and the different phases of this nexus, in line with the evolution of the mainstream economic development paradigms. From a perspective focusing on economic modernisation and the positive relationship between migration and development during the 1960s, the causality has been questioned during the 1970s and

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the 1980s by the dependency and world system theorists analysing the nexus in the context of unequal relations between the centres and the peripheries, migration being seen as a possible cause of 'underdevelopment' (Faist, 2008). The third phase of this debate is dominated by a very optimistic view of the nexus, supported by the current mainstream approach in development theory, where the state is no longer the unique nor the main actor but only a 'service provider for markets and partly for communities' (Faist, 2008: 25). In this particular perspective, migrants and their organisations are seen as actors of development, sharing common interests, and a moral responsibility towards their community left behind (Raghuram, 2009; Gabriel, 2013; Rodriguez and Schwenken, 2013).

In several European and African countries, this view of the link between migration and development has spurred political interest in the development potential of migrants as a substitute for official development assistance (e.g. Pina-Delgado, 2013). Consequently, responsibility for development in the countries of origin has been shifted to the actions of migrants and away from economic and political institutions, particularly the state (De Haas, 2010). Some studies also point to the growing interconnection between development assistance, migration control, and return policies (Gabas, 2009; MIGREUROPE, 2009). In a special issue of *Population, Space, and Place* published in 2009 on the migration-development nexus, Nicola Piper has underlined the importance to rethink the 'parameters and paradigms that dominate [this] revived debate' (Piper, 2009: 93). To do so, it is important to understand why, how, and who sets the international agenda on migration and development. This implies deconstructing the concept of 'migration management' used by various institutional actors to disseminate a technical and apolitical view of migration (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010; see also Geiger and Pécoud, 2012), a perspective that essentially ignores human and migrant rights (Wise *et al.*, 2013).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the discourses and practices on migration and development in the context of migration policies formulated to manage migration between Africa and Europe. In the first part of this paper, an analysis of the discourses mobilised by different actors to justify the promotion of the migration-development nexus will be conducted. The main

hypothesis is that this discourse stems from migration management concepts and frameworks advocated by the European Union (EU), particularly in its Global Approach to Migration (Council of the European Union, 2006). Secondly, the practices and roles of the actors involved in the design and implementation of the mechanisms to promote the migration-development nexus are analysed with a focus on Senegal. This choice has been made for several reasons: firstly, because Senegal has strong migration links with several European countries, France (the former colonial power) and more recently Spain and Italy¹; secondly, because Senegal is one of the priority sub-Saharan African countries for the EU and for those three member states; and thirdly, several initiatives promoting the link between migration and development have been implemented there recently. The analysis is based on a qualitative survey conducted between 2009 and 2010 (Appendix, list of organisations).²

WHY PROMOTING THE LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT HAS BECOME SO IMPORTANT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The European Union and its Global Approach to Migration

The role of migration in the framework of development cooperation between Europe and Africa has been institutionalised since the signing of the 'Cotonou Agreement' in 2000 – the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States on the one part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part (Nunn and Price, 2004). Subsequently, the events in Ceuta and Melilla in September and October 2005 catapulted African migration onto the agenda of the EU's external policy, as underscored by a European Commission document: 'The events in Lampedusa, Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands or in the Maltese and Greek waters concretely illustrate the increasing migratory pressure from Africa which the EU is confronted with.' (European Commission, 2010: 9; see also MIGREUROPE, 2006). At the end of 2005, the European Council then adopted a new 'Global Approach to Migration' with many of its 'priority actions' focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. The approach

seeks to strengthen the partnership between source, transit, and destination countries in relation to three 'equally important thematic dimensions: the management of legal migration, the prevention and reduction of illegal migration, and the relation between migration and development' (EUROPA, 2008: 1). The European Council justified the partnership on the following grounds:

'The European Council [...] underlined [...] the importance of closer cooperation with third countries in managing migration flows. It stated that specific partnerships on migration with third countries could contribute to a coherent migration policy, which combines measures aimed at facilitating well-managed legal migration opportunities and their benefits – while respecting Member States' competences and the specific needs of their labour markets – with those fighting illegal migration, protecting refugees and tackling the root causes of migration while at the same time impacting positively on development in countries of origin.' (Council of the European Union, 2007: 4)

According to policy officers at the European Union General Directorate for Justice, Freedom and Security (Personal Interview in 2009), the EU's Global Approach was thought as a way to shift from a mostly security-based discourse to a

discourse that includes other aspects of international migration management, that is mobility and development-oriented policies, that are more attractive to third countries. It was also a way to encourage African partners to collaborate on issues such as border controls and readmission agreements, while giving them more opportunities for legal migration (through temporary migration programmes) and more money to implement migration and development programmes. The EU's Global Approach has been *de facto* integrated into political dialogue on migration issues between the EU and Africa. This became clear at the first Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, held in Rabat on 10 and 11 July 2006, which laid the groundwork for the Europe-Africa partnership. In the so-called Rabat Declaration the signatory states asserted that they are

'Conscious that the management of migratory flows cannot be achieved through control measures only, but also requires concerted action on the root causes of migration, in particular through the implementation of development projects in Africa.' (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 2006: 2)

Figure 1 illustrates the increasing importance given to African migration in European policies. Different financial instruments have




Figure 1. Projects funded in sub-Saharan Africa from 2001 to 2006 (Source: the author) Note: Numbers in this figure indicate the number of projects funded; percentages account for the proportion of the total budget allowed to fund projects in sub-Saharan Africa.

been developed by the European Commission starting from 2000 to enhance cooperation with third countries in the area of migration. Among them, two budget lines: B7-667 for 2001–2003 (CSES, 2007) and the programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum (AENEAS) for 2004–2006 (European Commission, 2006). Figure 1 shows how the funds allocated to projects implemented in sub-Saharan Africa have increased over the recent years, from 5% of the total budget in 2001 to more than 30% in 2006. The projects funded were mostly aiming at the fight against illegal migration but also incorporated recently the development and migration nexus as a component of this objective.

The Economic Community of West African States and its Common Approach on Migration

Over the same period, African institutions adopted a new discourse on the urgency of managing migration between Africa and Europe. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, launched a discussion process with a view to developing a concerted approach to migration to provide 'a better understanding of the root causes of the desire to migrate to Europe' and to develop 'appropriate solutions to the contemporary problem of illegal migration' (ECOWAS, 2006: 1). At the Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou on 19 January 2007, a report on security in the region found that

'The Council agreed that the issue of migration in all its ramifications should be approached from a concerted regional standpoint, particularly as it has resulted in a massive loss to the region in terms of human resources. The Council called on the ECOWAS Commission to also address the issue of intra-regional migration, and pursue the dialogue with European partners in this regard.' (ECOWAS, 2007:1)

To draft its approach, ECOWAS received guidance from several organisations [the Sahel and West Africa Club, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Organisation for Migration

(IOM)]. ECOWAS's Common Approach on Migration was effectively adopted on 18 January 2008. For the first time ECOWAS member states officially underlined the link between migration and development (Kabbanji, 2011). In the case of Senegal, the importance of 'managing' migration has also grown only recently in political discourse.³ The main reason given by the different actors is the 'unprecedented scale of illegal migration flows' from Senegalese shores (Gouvernement de la République Française et Gouvernement du Sénégal, 2006: 2). An advisor at the Senegalese Ministry of Youth explained the recent interest in cooperating with European countries on migration issues, particularly migration and development, in the following terms:

'It was prompted by recent developments, the recent increase in irregular migration (...). Between 2006 and 2007 we observed an extraordinary phenomenon that people called irregular emigration (...). Many people were leaving, thousands and thousands of young people left our shores in the hope of reaching the Spanish or Italian coast, but especially Spain. That's when the president, Abdoulaye Wade, and his Spanish counterpart, showed their determination in resolving and tackling this sensitive problem head on, by negotiating and signing an agreement on managing this problem, on slowing and preventing the growth of migration.' (Personal Interview, Ministry of Youth, Dakar, 2009)

The migration-development nexus has thus only very recently been incorporated into the Euro-African regional policy agenda, concomitant with the emergence of a discourse conveying images of Europe 'invaded by illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa', and Africa 'deserted by its unemployed young people'. This discourse is mobilised by European and African institutions and through multilateral initiatives between the two regions to justify increasing interventions in the field.

How is the link between migration and development defined

The link between migration and development expressed in European development cooperation

with Africa is part of a broader thinking about the management of migration between the two regions, as recalled by the signatory countries to the Rabat Declaration adopted in 2006. They assert they are,

‘Aware that the destinies of our countries are linked and that only the development of an effective, rapid and tangible solidarity embodying both the imperatives of sustainable development and security for all will be able to offer a lasting answer to the management of migratory flows.’ (Euro African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 2006: 1)

The definition of the link between migration and development is hereby twofold: Firstly, by emphasising the positive role of migration and migrants for development in countries of origin and destination and secondly by stressing the importance of development in the countries of origin as a means to stem the emigration of certain categories of undesirable migrants. Moreover, there seems to exist a common understanding that the essential condition for international migration having a positive impact would be a ‘proper’ management – a management that consists in promoting (more) legal migration by matching the labour needs of destination countries with the labour supply from source countries. Two officers from the employment unit of the IOM office in Dakar reported that ‘in general, the programmes and activities that we finance are located in the migrants source regions. It therefore contributes to development. To start with, it creates income-generating activities and also helps create local jobs’ (Personal Interview, IOM office in Dakar, 2010).

The main assumption shared by the different agencies or actors (with the exception of some Senegalese non-governmental organisations (NGO), as described later) is that poverty is the main determinant and root cause of emigration. This serves clearly as a justification of the discourse of promoting development in migrants’ regions of origin to curb emigration. The ambivalence of international – particularly European – policy on migration and development is thus transposed to European development cooperation in Africa (Pastore, 2007). The discourse mobilized to

justify the importance of linking migration and development in sub-Saharan Africa has two underlying ideas: (i) tackling the root causes of migration and (ii) promoting migration for development.

A consensus emerges from the interviews with institutional actors (conducted in Dakar) on the need to coordinate the actions of migrants to maximise the impact on development in the country of origin. An officer from the French Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development in charge of evaluating co-development initiatives explained the reasons for implementing French public funding targeting co-development actions to better ‘structure’ the actions of migrants:

‘Because first of all they fit into a national development framework. Since we have relations with the national government, we will set up a health centre that will fit into the regional or local health system. We won’t build a health centre at the bottom of the village, like we used to. We will get the government to commit resources and staff. So migrants will contribute the infrastructure, we’ll sign a partnership between the government, the migrants and ourselves, it will be managed by the migrants – we won’t take over the management. So it’s their money, we contribute 70% of the budget, but it is managed by migrants’ associations that run tenders for contracts, etc.’ (Personal Interview, Dakar, 2009.)

In recent years, the Italian Development Agency has designed a strategy based on migrants’ private investment:

‘When Italy first started supporting the Migration for development in Africa programme, it was because we realised that our development cooperation approach could not be based solely on aid strategies where the Senegalese were seen as passive beneficiaries of development projects. Therefore, given that a large percentage of the Senegalese diaspora lives in Italy, we wanted to use those people’s skills, their human and financial resources for development in Senegal.’ (Personal Interview, Italian Development Agency, Dakar, 2009)

From another side, Senegalese NGO insist on the recognition of the important role that migrants have played well before the implementation of these different initiatives. A member of one of the oldest Senegalese development NGO, 'Union Solidarité Entraide' (USE), recalls that emigration to Europe began in the 1970s when the region was hit by drought. In that context, he said:

'Only two interventions prevented the residents of the valley from being wiped off the map of Senegal (...): the intervention of the migrants and the intervention of USE, who enabled the people in the valley to survive after years of drought. They helped people survive, they invested in the social arena and they contributed to investment in pure development to set up mechanisms that could be productive and grow. Most of the work accomplished by migrants was coordinated by USE.' (Personal Interview, USE, Dakar, 2009.)

The NGO 'Association pour le Codéveloppement' advocates rethinking the concept of 'co-development' as such – the very concept that is currently used to control migration flows to Europe,

'co-development is not about reducing migration flows; it's about getting to know each

other and working together, about the migrants who live in Europe contributing to development in Senegal. Maybe one day, when we reach the same level as you, there won't be any more migrants leaving for France or Spain or Belgium. But right now we can't reduce migration flows through co-development.' (Personal Interview, ASCODE, Dakar, 2009.)

PROGRAMMES PROMOTING MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL

A multiplication of actors and projects

Beyond the convergent principles put forward by the various actors to justify their growing interventions in the area of migration management, it seems necessary and interesting to study the practical implications of these interventions.

Recent years have seen a multiplication of actors and projects that try to promote the link between migration and development in Senegal (Table 1).

Since 2006, several Senegalese public institutions have become involved in migration. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Senegalese Overseas in August 2003, in June 2008, Senegal set up the Support Fund for Investment by Senegalese Overseas. This fund is 'intended to support migrants' projects in their countries of origin, and

Table 1. Organisations involved in migration and development programmes in Senegal.

Leading organisation	Funding agency	Programme
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Senegalese Ministry of Youth + International Labour Organisation	Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Temporary workers programme between Senegal and Spain International Labour Organisation-Migrant
French Office of Immigration and Integration + Senegalese Direction of Technical Assistance	French Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development	Co-development initiatives Programme to support solidarity initiatives for development
Italian Cooperation + International Organisation for Migration	Italian Cooperation	Migration for Development in Africa Migrant Women for development in Africa
Italian Cooperation + Senegalese Ministries		Platform of support for the private sector and valorization of the Senegalese diaspora in Italy
United Nations Development Programme + Senegalese Ministries Cooperazione Internazionale	United Nations Development Program European Union (AENEAS)	Transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals Returnnet

to maximize the impact of their investment on the local economy' (<http://www.co-developpement.org/index.php?sv=31&aid=996>). In 2006, the Senegalese Ministry of Youth became another key actor in strategies designed by the government, the IOM, and the EU to tackle irregular migration. The Ministry of Youth from then on also participated in managing legal migration to Spain and assisted in return migration programmes. In parallel, migration issues have become more prominent in recent years in the official development assistance provided by individual EU member states including France, Spain, and Italy.

French 'Co-development'

Funding for 'migration and development' projects in the case of France is provided through the 'Programme 301: Co-development and Migration' (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel de Contrôle de l'Immigration, 2010). According to the former head of the co-development department, it is a French innovation in this area that led to the creation of 'a specific official development assistance programme' (Bailleul, 2009: 12). Implemented by the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, the programme seeks:

'to foster development, by drawing on migration, within the framework of partnership relations based on seeking mutual benefit between host and source countries. [This] concerns in particular the least economically advanced countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, which are the source of migration flows to France.' (Charasse, 2010: 87)

Senegal is one of the priority countries in this programme, and the first to have signed an agreement on managing migration flows with France on 23 September 2006. French support for co-development in Senegal is governed by an agreement signed by France and Senegal in 2000, and a Priority Solidarity Fund called 'co-development initiatives' based on an agreement signed in 2005; this programme received a total budget of €4.5m in 2005. On 21 January 2009, Senegal also signed a bilateral agreement for the implementation of a 'programme to support solidarity initiatives for development' (PAISD). The planned budget for this was €9m over 3 years,

which was in fact later raised to €11m. The co-development initiatives and PAISD programmes have three common components:

'1) Support for promoters of private economic investment projects in Senegal; 2) Mobilization of the scientific and technical Senegalese diaspora for short assignments in Senegal; 3) Financial and technical support for associations of nationals to set up development local infrastructure in their regions of origin'. PAISD comprises another two components: '4) Solidarity volunteering for development; 5) Implementation of sector action to help overcome the digital divide.' (<http://www.codev.gouv.sn>)

Spain and 'Plan Africa'

In 2006, Spain adopted its first 'Plan Africa' for the 2006–2008 period (followed by a second plan for 2009–2012). 'Plan Africa' was mainly a response to 'the emergence of new challenges, such as massive unlawful migratory flows' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2006: 1). One of the plan's seven aims is 'to encourage co-operation to adequately regulate migratory flows from the sub-Saharan region and to combat illegal people trafficking' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2006: 1). Plan Africa also provides for an increase in financing for cooperation projects in sub-Saharan Africa; financing in this area increased from €33m in 2003 to €90m in 2006 and €120m in 2008. Since 2009, Spain has also financed a Spain-ECOWAS migration and development fund intended to strengthen the application of ECOWAS's Common Approach on Migration. This fund specifically seeks to support migration and development projects by civil society and organisations from ECOWAS member states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation/ECOWAS, 2009).

In its third master plan (2009–2012), Spain's development agency included a section devoted exclusively to migration and development issues for the first time (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2009). Senegal is one of the countries that benefits from the largest amounts of Spanish official development assistance. According to an officer from the Spanish development agency's office in Dakar, Spain has funded three major co-development projects in Senegal since 2006:

'(1) a project for the "promotion of local development in Senegal and transnational development through micro-finance and remittances" (REDEL), (2) another project for the construction of a primary school co-funded by the Senegalese migrants' in Spain conducted with the Senegalese NGO "Le savoir pour vaincre la pauvreté" (ANAFSA), and (3) a programme that supported trade unions working on migration and promoted partnership between Spanish and African (in this case Senegalese) trade unions.' (Personal Interview, Spanish Development Agency, Dakar, 2009)

Since the signing of a framework cooperation agreement on immigration with Senegal in 2007, Spain has also funded an exchange programme of temporary migrant workers.

Italy's development cooperation with Africa and Senegal

Italy's development agency started to work on issues of migration and development in Africa in 2003 and in the particular case of Senegal in 2006 when it co-funded the first Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) project in partnership with the IOM. An officer from the Italian cooperation stressed that one of the first projects developed in the area, the 'commodity aid' project, was a failure because the approach encouraged return migration in exchange for a gift or money. According to him, the Italian approach has changed a lot since then and now focuses on supporting the private sector in Senegal, with no conditionality of return for the migrants who benefit. Italy apparently began to promote migration and development initiatives for the following reason:

'Well, it's mainly because of the situation in Senegal. There's a large Senegalese community in Italy, which is very well integrated into civil society. They have very close ties with local communities. (...). That's how the communities were activated and we realized there was a lot of room for us to work together.' (Personal Interview, Italian Development Agency, Dakar, 2009)

Italy's development agency currently supports the following projects in Senegal: (i) platform of support for the private sector and valorization

of the Senegalese diaspora in Italy (PLASEPRI), (ii) Migrant Women for development in Africa (WMIDA), and (iii) facilitating a consistent approach to migration management in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Libya by promoting legal migration and preventing irregular migration.

The emergence of new actors

Senegal's three main partners France, Spain, and Italy have been joined in recent years by a plethora of organisations striving to position themselves (more or less successfully) as actors participating in discussions and the practical implementation of the migration-development nexus. For instance, the Swiss development agency's office in Senegal appointed a secretary in charge of migration issues in West Africa in 2007.⁴ One of the officers interviewed asserted that

'It's because I think that in the past few years, migration has become a fairly sensitive political issue and well. . . Switzerland did not want to be left out (laughter) from what was already being done in the European Union (...). As I said, the Swiss development agency has made migration and development an overall theme and I think we'll have. . . quite a few activities in the next months and the year ahead in this area. The funds have been disbursed, and now we are studying the sectors of development and migration where action will be focused.' (Personal Interview, Swiss Embassy, Dakar, 2009)

The interest in migration and development issues has also grown at the level of international and intergovernmental organisations, such as the subregional office of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the Sahel in Dakar, particularly through the ILO-Migrant project (2009–2012). One of the ILO officers explained why

'In Senegal, illegal migration ate up all the funding in 2006. In December 2006, the Madrid office of the ILO received a call from the ministry of social affairs, labour and migration, which was the relevant ministry at the time, asking it to support the first hiring processes in the source countries south of the Sahara, including Senegal. Afterwards. . . we tried to

include that (the link between migration and development) in our work with governments in the region (...).' (Personal Interview, ILO, Dakar, 2009)

Senegalese NGOs such as Association pour le Codéveloppement that have been working on development issues for many years stress that migrants have always contributed to development in their countries of origin, contrary to what the sudden political interest in the issue might suggest

'People started talking about co-development a few years ago, but it has existed for years and years. Why? Because the people who left Senegal and who live overseas – as a migrant I myself have contributed to my family's everyday development. Every family in Senegal has a migrant who sends money home, which helps the family live decently. Either the money covers food for the whole family, or is used to build a house for people to live in. Some people have even gone further than that and built health centres and schools.' (Personal Interview, ASCODE, Dakar, 2009)

It therefore appears that migration issues have only very recently been included in the political agenda of Senegalese institutions and European and international organisations working in Senegal. The discourses of the various actors justifying their interventions in migration and development converge. They are based on the following ideas: an increase in irregular migration from the Senegalese coast (this increase however is clearly not reflected in available data, see, e.g. www.mafeproject.com), which apparently requires 'concerted' management, notably with regards to the mobilisation of the actions of migrants and their organisations to contribute to the development of their origin countries.

ARE PRACTICES CONVERGING

To illustrate the tangible application of the dominant discourse on promoting the link between migration and development, we analysed the types of projects implemented in Senegal in recent years by type of organisation. The analysis covers projects that include a component related to the migration-development nexus. In addition

to the projects supported by the French, Spanish, and Italian development agencies mentioned earlier, the following programmes have also been included: a United Nations Development Programme initiative called 'Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals' (TOKTEN) implemented initially from 2002 to 2006 and in a new phase since 2010, a joint project by an Italian NGO (Veneto Lavoro) and a Spanish NGO (Federacion valenciana de municipios y provincias) with EU funding (Returnet), the ILO-Migrant programme funded by Spain, and various programmes to assist 'voluntary' return migration that also include a migration-development dimension.

The majority of these programmes are run by external organisations, especially international organisations (IOM, ILO, United Nations Development Programme, etc.) or European development agencies (France, Spain, Italy, Table 1). Senegalese government institutions are usually involved as partners in managing the projects (PAISD, PLASEPRI, TOKTEN, and Spain-Senegal labour migration programme), or more indirectly (MIDA and WMIDA). Donors are either European countries or the EU, with, in some cases, a token financial contribution from the Senegalese government (PAISD and PLASEPRI). Lastly, private and charitable organisations, both Senegalese and from the countries that provide the funds are generally contracted to implement the projects (European and Senegalese NGOs, mutual societies, banks, etc.).

A classification of the programmes shows that three main mechanisms are advocated for promoting the participation of migrants in development of their countries of origin: (i) promoting private or collective investments in so-called 'productive' sectors, (ii) promoting skills transfer, and (iii) promoting migrants' return (Table 2).

Promoting migrant investment in 'productive' sectors

It is first and above all about facilitating and channelling monetary transfers to the country of origin and promoting investment in 'productive' sectors through, (i) support for collective initiatives to develop migrants' regions of origin and (ii) support for migrants' private initiatives. Programmes that work wholly or partly on channelling migrants' savings into private investment are

Table 2. Typology of programmes.

Programme aim	Type of programme	Migrants targeted
Promoting transfer of skills	Expert assignments	Highly skilled legal migrants
Promoting migrants' collective economic investment in regions of emigration	Programmes to support collective investment	Migrant associations in destination countries
Promoting migrants' private economic investment in the countries of origin	Programmes to support individual economic projects	Entrepreneurs who have migrated legally
Promoting temporary labour migration	Temporary labour migration programme	Unskilled legal migrants (with an employment contract)
Promoting 'voluntary' return migration	Assisted voluntary return with support for an economic project	Illegal migrants eligible for 'voluntary' return

the most common: MIDA, WMIDA, PLASEPRI, REDEL, co-development initiatives, and PAISD. The advocated measures propose, (i) to reduce the costs of currency transfers and extend banking services to migrants (particularly the Spanish project REDEL) and (ii) to support financially (either by a grant or a loan and bank guarantees) and technically migrants' investment projects in their countries of origin, sometimes with the involvement of local governments. The planned activities range from help with drafting a business plan, feasibility study, obtaining a bank loan, provision of bank guarantees, and networking. These mechanisms target migrants who are legally living in Europe (except for co-development initiatives and PAISD, which include a section for illegal migrants, discussed later). One of the Italian officers interviewed explained the aims of PLASEPRI:

'We decided to concentrate on the private sector, particularly on migration and development, using migrants' human and financial resources to create wealth and start businesses in the countries of origin and channel those resources towards productive purposes, for the private sector.' (Personal Interview, Italian Development Agency, Dakar, 2009)

The co-development initiatives programme has supported 221 private business projects (including the projects of migrants eligible for 'voluntary' return), whereas PAISD has so far supported 85 business start-ups. MIDA has co-funded seven co-development projects promoted by migrants' associations, particularly in responsible tourism, as well as individual small and medium enterprise projects in Senegal, whereas WMIDA has co-funded five co-development projects run by migrant women in Senegal. Various programmes (co-development initiatives, PAISD, and ANAFA's project) also aim to channel migrants' investment into collective projects in their home regions, such as building infrastructure (school, healthcare, wells, etc.). An officer from the French Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development described the aims of the 'local development' section of PAISD:

'We can encourage migrants to invest in their countries and boost local development through this development programme with only small amounts of money from migrants. (...). What's really important is that it is done by migrants for the people and the villages where people are migrating from.' (Personal Interview, Dakar, 2009)

According to an officer of the direction for technical assistance in Senegal, codevelopment initiatives co-funded 44 local development projects between 2006 and 2008, whereas PAISD funded 27 projects in its first 6 months. These are projects 'in the sectors of water, wells, water pipes, water towers, dams and irrigation systems. In healthcare too' (Personal Interview, Section for Technical Assistance, Dakar, 2009). Within this framework, the role of the two programmes has also been to strengthen the capacity of migrants' associations according to one of the French advisors interviewed:

'Our aim is really to boost their ability to run development projects. The idea was to say, well, we can see that these associations have been doing a lot for their villages for 30 years, and we have come to offer a whole working method so that tomorrow they can run development projects themselves, possibly seek other donors, and be familiar with all the stages from the idea of a project until its final delivery, including the rules, institutions, the necessary permits, etc. (...) Therefore our role is really to support migrants as actors of development who are becoming stronger.' (Personal Interview, Direction for Technical Assistance, Dakar, 2009)

Promoting skill transfers: experts as a 'driving force' for developing Senegal

Other types of programmes such as TOKTEN, co-development initiatives, and PAISD seek to send highly skilled migrants from the Senegalese diaspora on short-term expert assignments back to Senegal. The main idea is 'to contribute to the economic and social development in Senegal' as reported by the Senegalese officer of PAISD (Personal Interview, Direction for Technical Assistance, Dakar, 2009). These programmes are based on an assumption that expert assignments can partly offset the 'brain drain'. An officer from the TOKTEN programme in Senegal explained that the ultimate goal was the permanent return of these experts; he regretted that of the 76 experts who participated in the first phase of the programme (from 2002 to 2006), only eight in the end returned:

'What we expected of the partners under this programme has not lived up to expectations. It is not really what we... I was told that the idea was really for them to return, not this circular thing. Well, there was that too, but not only that.' (Personal Interview, TOKTEN, Dakar, 2009)

Promoting the return of certain categories of migrants

Temporary workers programmes

Promoting the link between migration and development has also been integrated into programmes aimed at facilitating the return of unskilled migrants or irregular migrants. The temporary labour migration programme between Senegal

and Spain is designed as an alternative to undocumented migration. The idea was to offer short-term contracts mainly for unskilled migrants. These migrants were offered a temporary work permit for unskilled jobs in the agricultural sector for 1–9 months with the obligation to come back after the end of their contract. According to the ILO officer involved as a partner, the migrants

'would have the opportunity (...) to set up small businesses (...) if they are lucky enough to have some savings. We are also trying to make sure (...) they don't spend everything on consumption but reinvest it, so it can be used to start something (...), so it triggers a process of local and economic development for them.' (Personal Interview, ILO, Dakar, 2009)

However, opportunities for circular migration under this type of programme are limited because they depend on renewal of the work contract, which is the prerogative of the Spanish employer. In fact, most of the workers who left in the first round were unable to return to Spain in the second year. In addition, the type of labour supplied (unskilled) and the short-term nature of the contracts do not enable the migrants to acquire new skills or savings.

Voluntary return programmes

The aim of 'voluntary' return programmes is summed up by the head of the Returnet-Italy programme in Senegal: 'The aim of the project was to try to facilitate the reintegration here in Senegal of Senegalese migrants living illegally in Italy or Spain who wanted voluntarily to return here to Senegal, given their irregular status and difficult situation' (Personal Interview, Cooperazione Internazionale, Dakar, 2009). The project claims to have created a 'Returnet model', which combines the reduction of irregular migration with the promotion of the link between migration and development as explained later:

'Assistance for voluntary return is part of a global approach to migration management. On the one hand it involves the removal of illegal migrants from the host country, limiting the legal consequences of forced repatriation and the social marginalization due to the migrants' irregular status. On the other, it can include

support for development in the source country. (...). Assistance for voluntary return can be a stable influence on the main causes of irregular migration to enable lasting reintegration through socio-economic support measures and the re-investment of the return migrant's resources and skills to start a virtuous circle.' (Personal Interview, Cooperazione Internazionale, Dakar, 2009)

Another programme promoted by the IOM – the Assisted Voluntary Return, Libya Programme – is defined in the following terms by one of the officers in charge:

'It is a regional project that covers Ghana, Nigeria, Libya and Senegal, and it seeks to prevent irregular migration and to promote legal migration paths. The project therefore has different aspects, different focuses. (...). They include return and reintegration. That aspect was quite specific because it concerns mostly irregular migrants in Libya whom we assist. (...) We organize training. Generally this is training in basic business skills (...). After that we buy them the equipment they need, because we have funding for each of them (...).' (Personal Interview, IOM, Dakar, 2010.)

However, interviews conducted with beneficiaries of assisted 'voluntary' return programmes to Senegal showed that these persons were the least satisfied with their return and the least well integrated economically and socially in their home country (see Flahaux and Kabbanji, forthcoming for more informations). These 'voluntary' return migrants did not have the time to prepare their return, nor to acquire the necessary skills or enough savings to invest in an economic project in Senegal. The support provided by the programmes is not sufficient for successful economic reintegration. For example, the programme of the French Office for Immigration and Integration provides between €4000 and €7000 and the United Kingdom between €5445 and €6050; Belgium gives only €700 to €2000 to reintegrate 'voluntary' return migrants, whereas the IOM's 'voluntary' return programme from Libya proposes funding of only up to €500 per person (Personal Interview, IOM, Dakar, 2010). The Returnet programme is the only one not to include financial assistance for reintegration, relying instead on 'building migrants' social

networks' through networking with organisations that can assist them in their reintegration process. Most of the other programmes offer beneficiaries training in business skills. PAISD, for 'voluntary' return migrants from France, also funds a field study. These organisations say they monitor the businesses for a year. In terms of the number of beneficiaries, most of these programmes have benefited fewer than 100 people. Returnet has not even supported one of the 20 planned beneficiaries.

As seen in this section, various programmes have been initiated in recent years in Senegal to promote a particular view of the link between migration and development. All the programmes analysed have the aim, through different mechanisms, to promote the role of migrants – mostly their savings – in 'developing' their countries of origin by investing particularly in the private sector. This is based on a view of migrants as potential entrepreneurs who can contribute to poverty reduction and job creation. However, the majority of these programmes have not been independently evaluated. The data collected through interviews also reveals that the actual number of beneficiaries in general is (very) small. This questions the value of injecting development assistance to help a small number of migrants set up private businesses. Studying the case of Senegal has finally revealed how the return of irregular migrants has also become an integral part of policies promoting the link between migration and development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The analysis of the discourses and practices developed to promote the link between migration and development illustrates the three aspects of the new paradigm in migration policy, illustrated by the concept of 'migration management'. The new paradigm has led to a convergence in the discourses mobilised by the different actors to justify their increasing intervention in this field. The uses and consequences of this relatively new concept can be illustrated by the Senegalese case where the importance of managing Senegalese migration is justified by an inevitable increase in illegal migration to Europe (although this increase is not illustrated in the empirical data available; see, e.g. Lessault and Beauchemin, 2009). This discourse is mobilised both by European and Senegalese government institutions and by international and intergovernmental organisations.

Some NGO distance themselves slightly from the dominant discourse without really managing to make their voices heard. For example, the USE's budgets fell drastically in recent years, USE was also refused funding for several projects on migration that were submitted to donors including the EU (Personal Interview, USE, Dakar, 2009).

The so-called Global Approach to managing African migration, developed by the EU, is advocated to promote the link between migration and development. Cooperation between origin, transit, and destination countries is presented as the only way possible to control African migration to Europe, a necessary condition for migration to have a positive impact on development and to benefit to all the parties involved. Thus, substituting 'migration management' for 'migration policy' smoothes over power struggles and divergent interests and reduces migration to a 'challenge', a problem requiring technical management (Geiger and Pécou, 2010). From a practical point of view, this dominant discourse is supported by increasing funding from the EU and some member states (particularly France, Spain and Italy) to instil a particular view of the migration-development nexus, which foregrounds the role of migrants and their private initiatives in the economic development of their countries of origin.

In fact, the various mechanisms developed in recent years have tended to pursue two main goals: (i) to control the transnational practices of African migrants in Europe and (ii) to promote the return of unwanted migrants. As illustrated in the Senegalese case, European development agencies and international organisations play a leading role while governmental institutions of the origin countries are seen as facilitators in this process.

The importance given recently to migration issues in European development cooperation with Africa has led to the 'reification' of migration, to use Skeldon's (2008) term, as an instrument for promoting development. Placing 'the responsibility for development firmly on the migrants themselves' implies that the 'agency of the migrants takes primacy in the development of home areas and diverts attention from the importance of structural aspects of development policy' (Skeldon, 2008: 9). It has also led to the following definition of the 'good migrant': a documented person, preferably highly skilled, using his savings to make private investments in his country of origin.

ENDNOTES

1. For detailed information on Senegalese migration (to Europe), see www.mafeproject.com.
2. Five interviews were conducted in Brussels in October 2009 and 22 interviews in Dakar from November 2009 to December 2009 and in mid 2010. A standard questionnaire comprising open-ended questions was designed and then adapted to the characteristics of each interviewee and the mandate of his/her organisation. NVIVO software was used to analyse the data. I would like to thank Marie-Laurence Flahaux, a PhD student working on the Migration between Africa and Europe project, who helped me to conduct some of these interviews. This research was conducted within the DEMTREN project and received financial support from AFD-Hewlett Foundation-IRD-AIRD.
3. Senegal does not have a formal migration policy. Several ministries share responsibility for migration issues (Some, 2009).
4. Concretely, this interest is also manifested in an increase in the number of small migration-related projects funded by the embassy since 2007 (shooting of a film on child trafficking, job creation projects), participation in awareness-raising activities jointly with the IOM, support for an association that works to combat illegal migration and, more broadly, Switzerland's financial contribution to Frontex since 2006 (according to the officer interviewed, this amounts to approximately 2 million Swiss Francs annually). Switzerland participates in migration projects in Senegal through three programmes: (i) embassy funding for small projects, (ii) co-funding for an IOM project (migration profiles), and (iii) Frontex. Switzerland also sent a migration attaché to ECOWAS in 2009.

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APPENDIX

List of organisations

Organisation	Interviews conducted
EU Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security (in July 2010 divided into Directorate-General for Home Affairs and Directorate-General for Justice)	2
EU Directorate-General for Development	2
Ministry of Senegalese Overseas	1
Senegalese Ministry of Youth	1

(Continues)

Table 1. (Continued)

Organisation	Interviews conducted
Senegalese Technical Assistance Directorate (President's Office)	2
Swiss embassy in Senegal	1
Italian Development Cooperation Agency, regional office for Senegal, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Mauritania	2
Spanish Development Cooperation Agency Office in Senegal	1
Delegation of the French Office for Immigration and Integration in Senegal	1
French Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development (today: Ministère de l'immigration, l'intégration, l'asile et le développement solidaire)	1
International Labour Organisation, Sub-Regional Office for the Sahel region	2
International organisation for migration, regional office for West and Central Africa	
• Immigration and employment unit	2
• Development and immigration unit	1
• Operations unit	1
United Nations Development Programme Office in Senegal	1
Association Union Solidarité Entraide (Senegal)	1
Conseil des ONGs d'Appui au Développement (Senegal)	1
Association pour le Codéveloppement (Senegal)	1
Centrale Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal	1
Cooperazione Internazionale (Senegal)	1
Caritas Senegal	1
Total	27